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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
materiality is not required to prove second degree perjury, if she must
prove lack of jurisdiction she must have notice as to the basis of the jurisdiction.
PEOPLE'S BURDEN OF PROVING DEFENDANT NOT IN THE THROES OF AN EPILEPTIC ATTACK

A majority decision of the Court of Appeals78 in People v. Higgins"
reversed a conviction for first degree murder, since the People had failed to
sustain their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time
defendant attacked the deceased, the defendant was not in the throes of an
epileptic furor attack,80 hence, the verdict of the jury was against the weight of
the evidence. 8 1
The prosecution had attempted to carry its burden by focusing attention
on the defendant's motive and co-ordinated movements during and immediately following his alleged seizure, contending that nineteen or more blows to
the head of the decedent and successfully operating a car in an alleged postconfusional state, as well as an apparent recollection of the crime, was inconsistent with any theory of having undergone a furor seizure. But the Peoples'
experts, as well as the defendant's witnesses, conceded that the post-confusional
state could include automatic type behavior, and although substantial recollection does refute any possibility of a seizure,8 2 reconstruction through deduction
was possible. Thus, motive became an important consideration.
People v. Barber presented a defendant who had unexplainedly attacked
a husband and wife, friends of long standing, then set fire to their home, killing
the wife.83 The court reversed the conviction for first degree murder and
stated that the motive was important on the issue of insanity. Here the People
unsuccessfully attempted to show that the motive was to prevent the girl from
relating to mutual acquaintances defendant's amorous adventures with her,
but this was more of an unfounded suggestion by the prosecution rather than
an inference from evidence adduced at trial.
The apparent lack of motive may well have been the controlling factor in
the courts decision, for without some purpose intended by the defendant in
committing the crime the equivocal nature of the testimony regarding memory
78. The court split, four to three, on the issue of reversing because the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence. The dissenting and concurring opinions did not detail
their objections, but merely concluded that the court was invading the province of the
jury, and concentrated on the failure of the trial court to charge the jury on intoxication,
which was not the basis for decision.
79. 5 N.Y.2d 607, 186 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1959).
80. There are four main types of epilepsy; The grand mal, where the patient is
completely helpless; petit mal, prevalent in children; psychomotor, during which the
patient is out of contact but has seemingly purposeful movements; thalamic, the furor
seizure characterized by strange attacks of rage, often manifested by swinging and hitting.
81. People v. Kelly, 302 N.Y. 512, 99 N.E.2d 552 (1951).
82. The post-confusional state is the recovery period of the patient from the clonic
reactions of the seizure, during which time he may perform automatically while semicomatose.

83.

115 N.Y. 475, 22 N.E. 182 (1889).
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and co-ordinated movements proves too slender a reed upon which to support
a judgment sending a man to the electric chair.
PowER OF GRAND JuRY

To COPEL WITNESS TO CO3PLETE QUESTIONNAIRE
In People v. Sheriff of New York" relator, who had waived his immunity,

was ordered by the Grand Jury to complete a financial questionnaire and to
return and swear that the answers therein were true. Although he was willing
to give oral testimony concerning the information requested he refused to
complete and submit the questionnaire. For this refusal he was held in contempt
and imprisoned. In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding he challenged the
power of the grand jury to compel other than oral testimony where documentary evidence did not previously exist.
The grand jury can receive no other evidence than such as is given by
witnesses produced and sworn before them or furnished by legal documentary
evidence.85 The appellant contended that when he answered all proper questions orally and stated that he had no financial status records already in existence he satisfied the grand jury's mandate, and that to compel the questionnaire in effect required him to create evidence where none already existed.
The Court of Appeals, 4-3, held that the grand jury can compel a witness
to answer and submit a written questionnaire if it is reasonably intended to
expedite the proceedings.86
Since the questions could be asked orally,87 there is no reason why defendant should not be compelled to record them. The court reasoned that a
defendant could obviously not supply the answers from unaided memory, and
therefore he could repeatedly delay the proceedings by seeking adjournments
to refresh his memory. Such continuing interruptions might so seriously delay
the investigation by the grand jury that the defendant would himself be
perpetuating an injustice.
The dissent reasoned that Section 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
literally construed, disallows compelling a witness to create documentary
evidence.88 Since the grand jury derives its power to obtain evidence from
the Legislature, broadening the method of obtaining evidence is properly a
legislative function.
Although perjury convictions have been sustained on the basis of these
questionnaires, their validity has never been directly challenged. 9 Since the
84. 6 N.Y.2d 487, 190 N.Y. Supp. 641 (1959).
85. N.Y. CoDE CRan. PRoc. § 248. An exception exists when the witness is dead,
insane, or can't with due diligence be found within the state.
86. Supra note 84.
87. People v. Connolly, 253 N.Y. 300, 171 NX.. 393 (1930).
88. N.Y. CODE CRim. PRoc. § 248.
In the investigation of a charge, for the purpose of indictment, the
grand jury can receive no other than: 1. Such as is given by witnesses
produced and sworn before them, or furnished by legal documentary
evidence; . ..."
89. People v. Workman, 308 N.Y. 668, 124 N.E.2d 314 (1954); People v. O'Brien,
305 N.Y. 915, 114 N.E.2d 470 (1953).

